Ethical Conundrums and Virtual Humans by Reader, John & Savin-Baden, Maggi
ORIGINAL ARTICLES Open Access
Ethical Conundrums and Virtual Humans
John Reader1 & Maggi Savin-Baden2
# The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
This paper explores ethical conundrums and virtual humans through building upon a post-
Kantian framework, and one emerging fromwhat is known asNewMaterialism. It begins by
presenting the recent research and literature on virtual humans and suggesting that the central
ethical conundrums that need to be examined are those of agency and values. The paper then
argues that a combination of Luciano Floridi’s approach and one developed from New
Materialism, namely modest ethics, offers a means of engaging with the ethical conundrums
of virtual humans. It is argued that as yet there is little evidence for a democratic design
process for virtual humans nor is there evidence about the possible impact virtual humans
may have on a postdigital society. The paper concludes by suggesting that there need to be
more open processes for debate which bring to light the values that are being built into these
profound developments by the experts and focuses on using a modest ethics approach.
Keywords Virtual humans . Newmaterialism .Modest ethics . Agency . Artificial
intelligence
Introduction
One of the concerns articulated in the paper and supported by work such as that of
Bernard Stiegler (2016) is that the current economic and political structures have
determined the development and deployment of virtual humans to serve certain vested
interests. This raises the question of whether and how there could be alternatives based
on earlier interventions and a different understanding of how humans interact with the
non-human and the digital. A combination of Luciano Floridi’s approach and one
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developed from NewMaterialism offers a means engaging with the ethical conundrums
of virtual humans. Floridi (2011, 2015) sets out to develop a framework encompassing
the whole of reality which incorporates digital technologies as part of an expanded
understanding of human autonomy.
New Materialism emerged as a term during the late 1990s, primarily in the context
of interpretations of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and was undertaken as a response
to a with the crude reductionist forms of atomic materialism. New Materialism affirms
such diverse processes as energy transformation and cellular reproduction but rejects
the idea of a hierarchical scale of values. Two main strands have developed; the first
associated with thinkers such as Levi Bryant, Jane Bennett, Rosi Braidotti (2013), and
Manual DeLanda (2002), and the second with a more explicitly scientific interpretation
linking back to the work of Alfred North Whitehead and represented by Isabelle
Stengers (2011), Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (2010).
This paper the emphasizes the ethical implications of this approach and what we
intend to describe as a modest ethics. Two of the central concerns of this article are
firstly that there is currently no democratic process for the design of virtual humans.
Secondly, that as yet little is known about what the impact and unintended conse-
quences of creating virtual humans will be. Hence there are concerns both about the
process by which future developments will be shaped and how, for instance, non-
experts might be involved in this, and also the consequences of such non-involvement
on the shaping of those developments. What values and interests will drive future
developments if these are left to purely commercial and corporate forces?
Virtual Humans in Context
One of the challenges of discussing virtual humans is that everyone appears to have a
different idea about what counts as a virtual human. It is evident from the literature
(reviewed in-depth by Burden and Savin-Baden 2019) that the term virtual humans
tends to be used as an overarching one that includes other terms such as Chatbots,
Conversational Agents and Pedagogical Agents. Virtual humans are seen as human-like
characters on a computer screen or agents with embodied life-like behaviours which
may include speech, emotions, locomotion, gestures, and movements of the head, eyes,
or other parts of the body. Discussions around virtual humans often bring in the concept
of machine learning and, in particular, neural networks. Machine learning is defined
here as a computer system that can learn to make decisions based on the examination of
past inputs and results, so that its future decisions optimize some parameter – such as
perhaps recognizing faces in photographs. Whilst a machine learning system could well
be part of a virtual human, it is certainly insufficient to be a complete one. If the term
‘machine learning’ is actually used to mean a neural network-based system, then it is
probably not a necessary one either.
The result is the temptation to choose a behaviouristic definition of a virtual human,
typified perhaps by Turing’s original Imitation Game (Turing 1950). Behaviourist
definitions have, though, been frequently challenged (for example Searle 2014), along
with Chalmers’ (1996) arguments about zombies being portrayed in ways that might be
logically but metaphysically impossible. So perhaps useful working definitions, fol-
lowing (Burden and Savin-Baden 2019), are:
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& Virtual Humanoids are simple virtual humans reflect some of the behaviour,
emotion, thinking, autonomy and interaction of a physical human.
& Virtual Humans are software programmes which present as human and which may
have behaviour, emotion, and interaction modelled on physical human capabilities.
& Virtual Sapiens are sophisticated virtual humans which achieve similar levels of
presentation, behaviour, emotion, interaction, self-awareness and internal narrative
to a physical human.
Harari, in Homo Deus (2015), explores the projects that will shape the twenty-first
century. Much of what he argues is disturbing, such as the idea that human nature
will be transformed as intelligence becomes uncoupled from consciousness. Google
and Amazon, among others, can process our behaviour to know what we want
before we know it ourselves, and as Harari points out, somewhat worryingly,
governments find it almost impossible to keep up with the pace of technological
change. Harari challenges us to consider whether indeed there is a next stage of
evolution and asks fundamental questions such as: where do we go from here?
Perhaps what it means to be human is bound up with understanding of conscious-
ness or the idea of having a soul. This is something Harari explores but he seems to
mix up religion and values by using the label ‘religion’ for any system that
organizes people, such as humanism, liberalism and communism.
Harari argues that ‘it may not be wrong to call the belief in economic growth a
religion, because it now purports to solve many if not most of our ethical dilemmas’
(Harari 2015: 2017). However, what is not clear in discussion about the relationship
between humans and virtual humans is whether technology is shaping our behav-
iour and our relationships. Similarly, Reader asks: What exactly is the relationship
between humans and technology and could it be the case that any distance between
has been so eroded that any sort of critical perspective is lost in the process? How, if
at all, can we absent ourselves when the impacts of digital technology are so
pervasive and invasive? (Savin-Baden and Reader 2018). Whilst descriptions of
virtual humans are useful to the debate, it is important to review the types of ethics
that relate to the issue of virtual humans.
Ethical Conundrums
Malle (2016) argues that robot ethics needs to examine questions about how humans
should design, deploy, and treat robots. He suggests that two issues need to be explored,
both of which apply to virtual humans, first ethical questions about how humans should
design, deploy, and treat robots, and secondly questions about what moral capacities a
robot should have. The history of robot ethics is largely seen as stemming from Isaac
Asimov’s famous Three Universal Laws of Robotics in 1950 (Asimov 1950). These
were based on the idea of robots being ethical themselves, but the field of robotics
ethics has become considerably more complex since then with the focus being on
researching robot ethics and ethical robots. The former is concerned with ethical use of
autonomous systems, while the latter is concerned with how autonomous systems can
themselves be ethical (Winfield et al. 2019). Currently, robot ethics features such topics
as ethical design and implementation as well as the considerations of robot rights.
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Hern (2017) reported that The European Parliament has urged the drafting of a
set of regulations to govern the use and creation of robots and Artificial Intelli-
gence (AI). However, machine morality explores issues about what moral capac-
ities a robot should have and how these might be implemented. It also includes
issues such as moral agency justification for lethal military robots the use of
mathematical proofs for moral reasoning (Malle 2016). There are a range of
debates on whether robots and virtual humans can have both emotions and
empathy. For example, Prinz (2011) suggests that empathy is not needed for moral
judgement whereas moral judgement does require emotion. However, Docherty
(2016) argues that robots and robot weapons lack both emotions and empathy and
therefore cannot understand the value of human life.
Engaging with virtual humans offers people opportunities to connect with
something emotionally and feel supported, even loved, without the need to
reciprocate. Although this kind of inter-relationship is becoming more common
(Levy 2008) it introduces challenging questions about what it means to be human.
Malle argues that.
any robot that collaborates with, supports, or cares for humans—in short, a
social robot—poses serious ethical challenges to the human design and
deployment of such robots, and one of the most important challenges is to
create a level of moral competence in these robots that is adequate to the
application at hand (Malle 2016: 244).
Borenstein and Arkin (2016) argue that the main issues that need to be considered are
affective attachment, responsiveness and the extent and duration of the proximity
between the human and the robot. Emotional connection has also been found to be
one of the strongest determinants of a user’s experience, triggering unconscious
responses to a system, environment or interface. For example, Reeves and Nass
(1996) argue that humans do relate to virtual humans in similar ways to humans, but
that voice and affect are central to agency attribution. Recent work in this area would
support this (Savin-Baden et al. 2013), as it found that emotional connection with
pedagogical agents is intrinsic to the user’s sense of trust and therefore likely to affect
levels of truthfulness and engagement. The implications of this study are that truthful-
ness, personalisation and emotional engagement are all vital components in using
pedagogical agents to enhance online learning. The study also indicates the importance
of the need for behavioural (as opposed to photorealistic) authenticity of the virtual
human, in terms of it being effective in influencing humans. Thus, an ethical concern is
the extent to which a robot affects a human’s autonomy, for example, whether those
people who have trouble forming relationships will develop an over-dependent rela-
tionship with a robot which reduces their ability to act as an autonomous human being.
Virtual humans are designed using human decision criteria and therefore ethical
behaviour need to be ‘designed-in-to’ virtual humans. However, in the context of the
range of virtual humans that are being developed, designing appropriate and effective
ethics standards are complex and far reaching. For example, if autonomous combat
robots or AI are deployed by the military whose fault is it if they mistakenly attack or
fail to distinguish correct targets? Riek and Howard (2014) suggest that design
considerations should include:
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& reasonable transparency in the programming of robotic systems,
& predictability in robotic behaviour,
& trustworthy system design principles across hardware and software design, and
& opt-out mechanisms.
What is clear is that there is little legal guidance, and, in many instances, current ethical
guidelines supplied by governments, universities and professional bodies fail to deal
with the changing challenges of ethics and virtual humans.
Much of the debate that occurs in the public sphere about the place of virtual
humans in society focuses on whether they will take over jobs and lives, as
discussed often at the UK’s House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial
Intelligence (2018). However, the issues are much more complex than this. For
example, questions about the use of virtual humans for the social good introduce
questions about what counts as the social good and who decides? Can or should
virtual humans have rights? Are there different levels of virtual humans that
require different levels of ethical stances? Underpinning all of these questions is
the need to delineate the values that inform the development, creation and
management of virtual humans. This in turn raises questions of agency.
Work about agency in relation to virtual humans has concentrated on attributed
agency. Attributed agency is both the sense of agency and the way in which agency is
attributed to a human, virtual human or digital immortal. In the case of virtual humans
what seems to be evident is that the context affects the sense of agency. For example,
Obhi and Hall (2011) found that humans consider face to face shared action with other
humans different from human-computer shared actions. The findings indicated that
attributed agency tends to be over-ruled when the participant is aware the computer is a
co-actor. Studies such as this seem to imply that humans are more likely to attribute
agency to other humans but not to virtual humans.
Posthumanism seeks to break down binary distinctions between ‘human’, ‘machine’
and ‘text’ (Hayles 1999, 2012) and between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ thus also rejecting
dualisms that are used to define beings as either subject or object. Thus, it is a theory
that is used to question the foundational role of ‘humanity’ and prompts consideration
of what it means to be a human subject, and the extent to which this idea is still useful.
This has overlaps with Actor Network Theory (Latour 1987) where the arguments
centre on the idea that actors may be both human and non-human, thus for example
supermarket products and digital devices are seen as actors that have influence, but it
not clear how all this relates to the creation of a virtual human.
Questions about the exact nature of human agency and particularly the relationships
between the human and the non-human are central to New Materialism. A possible
weakness of this approach is that its understanding of what it is to be human detracts
from the capacity of humans to be effective agents, particularly at a social or political
level. It will be the argument of this paper that some New Materialist interpretations in
fact add to rather than subtract from a necessary concept of human agency and provide
a more adequate base for political engagement. One needs to be aware though that the
New Materialist writers do not share a united view on this issue but represent a
spectrum of possibilities. The key question is that of whether and how this recent work
retains a sense of agency adequate for social and political engagement, whilst balancing
it with a more limited notion of human autonomy and which allows greater scope for
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the agency of the non-human, notably as in constant and shifting assemblages of both
human and non-human.
Drawing upon Latour (1987, 2004), and more closely associated of course with
Actor Network Theory, the argument is that there are many actants or agents at work in
the world and that humans are only a small fraction of these. Relationships between
humans and non-humans and indeed between non-humans, are entangled and
enmeshed and have to be understood as such. As the New Materialist authors DeLanda
(2010), Bennett (2010) and Bryant (2014) argue, humans and non-humans form part of
assemblages that need to be identified and examined example by example. Latour’s
main concerns are more environmental and represent a need to redefine the traditional
distinction between nature and society. If it were as simple as bringing those two into a
straightforward relationship, then the ecological crisis which is now upon us would
have been averted. Instead, what is required is a new way of understanding the
collectives or assemblages which incorporate both nature and society and then to allow
the non-human a voice in the process of political debate.
We are going to show how humans and non-humans, provided that they are no
longer in a situation of civil war, can exchange properties, in order to compose in
common the raw material of the collective. Whereas the subject-object opposition
had the goal of prohibiting any exchange of properties, the human-non-human
pairing makes such an exchange not only desirable but necessary. This pairing is
what will make it possible to fill up the collective with beings endowed with will,
freedom, speech, and real existence. (Latour 2004: 61).
The apparently unlikely outcome that Latour is trying to achieve, is that non-humans
should have their own voice, and they can do this through the intermediaries of
spokespersons, someone who can speak in their place. To describe these intermediary
states Latour (2004: 64) argues ‘we can use the notions of translation, betrayal,
falsification, invention, synthesis or transposition’. His argument is that this is what
scientists in their lab coats are doing most of the time, and that they can and do speak on
behalf of those other actants. The lab coats have invented speech prostheses which allow
non-humans to participate in the discussions with humans, especially when they are
perplexed about the participation of new entities in collective life. Effectively, the barrier
between science and politics is broken down by these means. This challenges the
traditional distinction between subjects and objects. By restoring both human and
non-human to civil life, they can both shed the old garments that marked them as
subjects and objects in order to participate collectively in what Latour calls ‘the
Republic’ (2004: 71). However, it could be argued that the division between things
and people still remains, and that our gaze, as if we were watching a tennis match, is now
turned towards objects, and now towards subjects. Latour wants to use this image in a
positive sense though, as rather than referring to two different spheres of activity, the
shared goal of engaging in the game requires the attention of one to the other that he is
trying to advocate. The human non-human pairing does not refer us to a distribution of
the beings of the pluriverse, but rather to an uncertainty, a profound doubt about the
nature of action, and indeed a variety of positions that make it possible to define an actor.
These are part of the matters of concern in which humans participate with non-humans.
Although Latour would not count himself a New Materialist author, the influence of
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Deleuze is still apparent as he develops his notion of assemblages of the human and the
non-human. DeLanda (2010) also draws on Deleuze’s meaning of assemblage:
What is an assemblage? It is a multiplicity which is made up of heterogeneous
terms and which establishes liaisons, relations between them, across ages, sexes
and reigns - different natures. Thus, the assemblage’s only unity is that of a co-
functioning; it is a symbiosis, a ‘sympathy’. It is never filiations which are
important, but alliances, alloys; these are not successions, lines of descent, but
contagions, epidemics, the wind. (Deleuze 1987: 69).
Although this offers a broad picture of how he wants to use the term, it only goes so far
in addressing more critical questions such as when does an assemblage count as such
and how and where does one draw the line.
Ethics, Virtual Humans and New Materialism
The intentionnow is to examine twodifferent approaches to ethics and virtual humans.
The first is that of Luciano Floridi, and the second is one that someof us are developing
fromNewMaterialism but is not intended to be an uncritical appropriation of that. The
implicationwhichderives fromboth approaches is that previous ethical frameworksor
approaches are inadequate to address the issues and dilemmas that are now emerging.
The Floridi approach (2011, 2015) is a bold and creative one which attempts to build
upon existing interpretations, notably that of Kant (1998), but with significant devel-
opments. While acknowledging the value of Floridi’s approach, the alternative to be
presented emerges from a different tradition of continental philosophy and argues for
greater discontinuitieswith earlier ethical approaches. It may be that Floridi’s position
is better placed to address existing technological developments at the level of gover-
nance and regulation, but that to more fully engage with future developments some-
thing more fluid and radical is required. In particular, as we have seen, discussions
about virtual humans are highly technical and inaccessible to most non-experts, while
the potential consequences of these developments are profound in terms of how
humans understand themselves. What is being suggested is that this is not an ‘either-
or’ argument butmoreof a ‘both-and’, reflecting themodesty and limitedclaimswhich
are characteristic of this alternative approach. In many ways the idea of modest ethics
can be aligned with the idea of the postdigital (for example Jandrić et al. 2018) since
both prompt a rupture in our existing theories. The modest ethics approach rejects
over-arching ethical frameworks and their limited respect for the empirical complex-
ities of real-world scenarios and the power and agency that such frameworks ascribe to
human rationality.Modest ethics embraces a deep interconnection between ethics and
materiality, leading to a new kind of worldly ethics, which is more-than-human in its
scope.
Floridi’s work (2015) is part of a larger project including an earlier book The
Philosophy of Information (Floridi 2011). Floridi himself agrees that there is much
work still to be done in this area hence there is a level at which all of this work is
exploratory and tentative. Nevertheless, by engaging with Floridi’s theory as a
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substantive position, it will become clearer where and how the differences with the
alternative approach are important. The claims that he makes are quite radical. For
instance: ‘We are modifying our everyday perspective on the ultimate nature of reality,
from a materialist one, in which physical objects and processes play a key role to an
informational one’ (Floridi 2015: 10). One implication of this is that the right of usage
will be perceived to be as at least as important as the right to ownership. This is an
ontological claim, one about the nature of reality itself, and one can see from the
perspective of current technological developments why this would appear to be a valid
direction to take. Floridi talks about the Infosphere and the way in which we will all be
living ‘onlife’ and ‘online’ in due course, and how those who are prevented from
participating in this will be the wrong side of a digital divide. From a political and
regulatory perspective this is an important argument, but it does preclude the alternative
interpretations of materialism presented by the New Materialisms (Reader 2017). What
might these have to offer to the debate?
Floridi suggests that Information Ethics is a macroethics, thus making claims about
not just the nature of reality, but the ways in which politics and governance should
engage with the issues raised. In order to do this Floridi (2015: 31) presents an
argument for what he calls ‘levels of abstraction’. This raises a number of contested
philosophical positions which, again, are difficult to do justice to in a short article but
which do need to be registered. Floridi is making universal claims for his approach,
ones that are a development of a Kantian position in that respect.
Understanding the nature of IE (Information Ethics) ontologically rather than
epistemologically, modifies the interpretation of its scope and goals. Not only can
an ecological IE gain a global view of the whole life-cycle of information, thus
overcoming the limits of other microethical approaches, but it can also claim a
role as a macroethics, that is, as an ethics that concerns the whole realm of reality,
at an informational level of abstraction’. (Floridi 2015: 27).
Floridi (2015: 33) acknowledges pluralism without descending into what he calls a
relativism in which ‘anything goes’. There are two concerns here. The first concern is
that there is a serious challenge to Floridi’s interpretation of relativism from within
philosophy. For instance, Latour suggests instead that relativism in itself is not a bad
thing and is not to be equated with an ‘anything goes’ argument as Floridi suggests
(Latour 2004: 12). There may be less distance between Latour and Floridi than might at
first appear, but this does suggest that Floridi is still operating from within a Kantian
framework and one which presents us with a binary that is worth challenging: either
universalism or relativism.
The second concern is that the concept of assemblages, especially as deployed by
DeLanda (2010), is not so different in its intention of finding ways of interpreting and
analysing reality at different levels. However, the advantage of the idea of assemblages
is that they are contingent, shifting and dynamic alliances of different elements and
components, both human and non-human, and therefore present a more fluid under-
standing of the relationships between humans and the digital technology. This would
allow for the ways in which the technologies shape humans as much as the humans
shape the technology, a critical point when it comes to understanding the limits of
human agency. Floridi is still wedded to what is a development of the Kantian
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(1998) position of the existence of autonomous agents, even though he wants to extend
this beyond the human in a way that Kant would never have done.
In contrast to Floridi’s universalist approach, the alternative we are building upon
and beyond New Materialism is more modest or limited in its claims, thus perhaps
better able to acknowledge and take into account different interpretations without
reducing them to some form of relativism (Reader and Evans 2019). This does not
mean refusing to make any claims, but a greater willingness to work across disciplinary
boundaries and to acknowledge the contribution of different traditions, including
religious ones.
When Hegel (1821) said that the owl of Minerva only spreads its wings with the
falling of the dusk, he could have been referring to all attempts to address the issue of
an ethics of the digital. What he probably meant was that philosophy generally comes
too late on the scene and only grasps the true nature of an historical period once it is
drawing to a close. Is the same inevitably the case when it comes to developing an
ethics which seems unable to get ahead of technological developments? Once systems
and technologies are already in place, only then is the moment to evaluate and to try to
regulate in order to contain the worst and most damaging excesses. Floridi’s ethics of
information is an attempt to establish some public criteria by which to assess and
control these developments at an earlier stage in the process, but does it go far enough?
In the ‘both-and’ scenario for which we are arguing here, the suggestion is that
alternative philosophical sources can be employed to engage these developments in
ways that Floridi is unable to envisage. It is important therefore to understand the
claims that he is making for his approach. Whereas many standard ethical approaches
focus on the agent, Floridi’s claim centre on less orthodox frameworks such as medical
ethics or bioethics, an equal or greater concern with the patient. However, even these
alternative approaches are still biased against the inanimate, intangible, abstract,
engineered and artificial entities such as information and communication technologies
and any form of virtual human in the future.
We suggest that the concepts from a New Materialist understanding supplemented
by ideas from Latour as in our modest ethics, achieve the same objectives but without
having to make universal claims. The non-human in relation with the human but as part
of a flat ontology rather than a hierarchical one provides a more effective means of
interpreting the engagements with the inanimate and artificial. The question to be
addressed is surely that of how the non-human in the form of virtual humans might
change the nature of these relationships and require a different conceptuality. Later in
The Ethics of Information Floridi (2011) does address this issue, arguing that all
informational entities have an intrinsic moral value, although this may be minimal
and overridable, and that therefore they will qualify as moral patients demanding
respect (2015: 110). Also, ‘artificial informational entities, insofar as they can be
agents, can also be accountable moral agents’ (2015: 110).
Floridi sees this as an improvement upon the Kantian position, but this means that it
still rests upon some concept of the moral autonomous individual even though that is
not necessarily human, and it is exactly that understanding of the human (and non-
human) which New Materialism and those of us who develop this further, bring into
question. The binary between agent and patient is a development of, but still within the
same philosophical paradigm as a Kantian position. It is just that human characteristics
are extended into the non-human, which is something that Floridi himself wants to
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avoid. Once again, we would argue instead that understanding humans as parts of
human and non-human assemblages, and therefore also realizing that there are assem-
blages which don’t contain the human at all, is a more convincing means of recognizing
that there is moral agency here which needs to be addressed and evaluated.
We are arguing for a modest ethics, linked to a similar modesty in both science and
religion, but one has to be careful with this terminology: a modest claim is still a claim
which itself suggests a degree of force in the argument. Behind this lie a series of
substantive positions as articulated in the text. Knowledge as embedded and material
rather than distant and abstract, taking into account non-specialist perspectives, material
practices and the insights of other disciplines. A willingness to acknowledge the other
levels at which humans function, those of feelings and instincts as well as what is
normally termed the logical and autonomous. The realization that one is always already
in relationship with the non-human in shifting and evolving assemblages. Rather than
lone individuals exercising a means-ends rationality, we perceive that we operate within
a distributed agency and that can mean that we are as much shaped by the technology
we devise as we imagine the creation is under our complete control. Along with some
of the other influences identified, such as the work of Latour and Stiegler, this can lead
to a more modest ethics drawing on the insights of New Materialism as related to the
themes just identified.
In terms of the specific issues involved in the development of virtual humans there is
much to be debated as to how those traditional boundaries between the human and the
non-human are to be reconfigured and revised. To what extent do those feelings or
emotions we attribute to humans play a part both within the construction of virtual
humans let alone in their relationships with humans? What may change to both through
the interactions and relationships that will now develop? Does the language of rights
still have a function in this new context? What exactly is sentience and how essential is
it to what we will, from now on, count as authentically human? Once it is acknowl-
edged that it is always the case that even humans operate as part of shifting and re-
forming assemblages, how will this impact upon the ethical conundrums that we face as
a society? How does society itself guard against the purely commercial motivations that
will determine such issues?
Each of these questions requires the more fluid and dynamic interpretations of reality
that can be mined from New Materialism and related ideas. Ethics is less about
constructing frameworks according to which one can judge whether or not one is living
a good life or taking appropriate actions, than being worthy of the events over which
one has no or little control. Can we affirm, enhance and intensify such events through
the capacity to affect and be affected? In order to be of some practical use, however, this
requires a capacity to reflect and act, and not simply to be swept along by events. What
does this look like in practice and does it have advantages over the more traditional,
Kantian, rights-based approach we have also examined?
The concern with a traditional, rights-based or even environmental ethical approach
is that both come too late on the scene. Such approaches apply certain ethical principles
only after the important decisions have already been made: the targeting and the biases
are already built into the systems being deployed. Trying to identify or even challenge
and change those once they are already functioning is going to be too late. Governance
procedures might limit the scope of these operations, but no more than that. The
difficulty is that of entering the debate at an earlier stage, before the decisions have
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been made. We would argue that the understandings of a modest ethics as above stand a
better chance of avoiding the instrumentalist approach of more traditional ethical
frameworks—in other words, the ethics is no more than an application of ideas to
systems that are already in place—and instead engage with the material energies and
movements embedded in the technologies as they are being developed.
Discussion
The differences between Floridi’s approach and that of a more modest ethics are that his
ethics claims to be universal whereas ours is a more guarded in its claims and does not
rest on a hierarchical ontology. This becomes a political as well as an ethical challenge,
as illustrated in Table 1.
There is a clear difference over the issue of the material and the informational as
Floridi wants to reduce everything to the informational. His stance might be better
understood in the alternative framework as assemblages of the human and the non-
human, and indeed simply of the non-human. The issue of autonomy versus distributed
agency is also central to the argument, with the former still acting as an external and
human-based understanding of the world whereas the latter offers greater roles for the
non-human as agents. At the heart of the difference is Floridi’s binary of agent and
patient as a New Materialist approach would destabilize and disrupt such a binary and
question whether this is a satisfactory means of engaging with not only other humans
but also the non-human. If this could be translated into activity then it might enable that
earlier intervention into the development of virtual humans and the values that will
drive it that both we and Floridi would wish to see established.
What is clear from the review of the ethical conundrums is that there are two major
issues. The first issue is agency. The second issue is how to engage and intervene in the
developments that are yet to take place and how to influence or shape the values that will
determine them. At the heart of the difference is Floridi’s binary of agent and patient, as a
modest ethics approach would destabilize and disrupt such a binary and question whether
this is a satisfactory means of engaging with not only other humans but also the non-
humans. If this could be translated into action, then it might enable that earlier intervention
into the development of virtual humans and the values that will drive such development
that both we and Floridi would wish to see established. Experimentation and the use of
virtual humans has been discussed for many years, but the ethical concerns in this area
Table 1 Ethical conundrums
Floridian stance Modest ethics stance
Informational ethics Universal Embedded materialist
Robotic ethics Rights based Interactive assemblages
Affective attachment Expanded or Inclusive Autonomy Pre-autonomous
Ethical design Governance and Law Hybrid Forums
Agency Patient model, namely Systems and
Networks of Agents and their behaviour.
Distributed agency
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remain troublesome. Indeed, as Riek and Howard (2014) note, in the US consumer robots
developed by industry require little ethical intervention before being sold. Also there are
practical concerns that still need to be addressed. For example, issues of privacy when
virtual humans are being used as physically assistive robots, the loss when a virtual human
is removed, the possible impact of virtual human sentience on humanity.
Conclusion
Ethics, along with both science and religion, need to exercise a degree of modesty. Claims
to establish truth in some exclusive manner, and therefore at the cost of an open
engagement with other contributions, need to be tempered by the recognition that no
one approach has the monopoly of truth. The danger with our institutions and indeed our
academic disciplines is that they tend to become so dominant and all-consuming that they
begin to make inflated claims for their importance and significance. Modesty is needed in
truth claims then, but also modesty in recognizing the day to day realities of our lives, the
others on whom we depend, whether human or non-human, and the complexities which
we all too often reduce to convenient generalities in order to manipulate and control. In
philosophy there is a tendency to construct ethical frameworks in order to cope with that
complexity and produce criteria by which we can evaluate human action and make
decisions about the right way forward. However, one of the contributions of New
Materialism is to challenge this way of working on the grounds that it oversimplifies the
complexity and underestimates the uncertainties and contingencies of our lives. We need
to become more comfortable with that which we cannot control and which is constantly
moving beyond us. Modesty may demand that we move more slowly and carefully rather
than dashing ahead in ways that our culture and digital technology encourages us to do.
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